Bargaining behavior, demographics and nationality : a reconsideration of the experimental evidence by Botelho, Anabela et al.
1~FOHRGH,QYHVWLJDomRHP0LFURHFRQRPLD$SOLFDGD
8QLYHUVLGDGHGR0LQKR
%DUJDLQLQJEHKDYLRUGHPRJUDSKLFV
DQGQDWLRQDOLW\
$UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKH
H[SHULPHQWDOHYLGHQFH
Anabela Botelho 
Glenn W. Harrison 
Marc A. Hirsch 
 Elisabet E. Rutström  
 
 
 
December 2001 
:RUNLQJ3DSHU6HULHV
1R
Bargaining Behavior, Demographics and Nationality:
A Reconsideration of the Experimental Evidence
by
Anabela Botelho, Glenn W. Harrison,  Marc A. Hirsch &  Elisabet E. Rutström †
December 1, 2001
ABSTRACT
Bargaining behavior appears to vary across nations. What drives these apparent differences?
We reconsider the evidence provided by previous experiments, and undertake some new
experiments that expand the controls for demographics. We show that inferences about
country effects are sensitive to the way in which the data are analyzed and the controls that
are incorporated. Separating out differences in initial behavior versus trend shows significant
differences in both.  Adding interaction effects between countries, gender, and ethnic
background shows that cultural differences are more complex than the factors captured by
either nationality or gender alone. Some subgroups behave in ways which are clearly closer
to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction than others.
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1 RPOZ note (p.1068) that: “... a major methodological goal of the present investigation was to give us the
opportunity to learn from experience how to deal with the formidable problems of experimental design that come to the
fore in constructing a multinational experiment, particularly if one of the goals of the experim ent is to investigate
possible cultural differences. These problems include how to control for potential experimental artifacts arising from the
different languages in which instructions are given, the different currencies in which subjects are paid, and the different
experimenters who conduct the trials in each country. To the extent that these factors can be controlled, different
behavior in the different subject pools can cautiously be used as the basis for preliminary conjectures about cultural
differences that might account for the different observed behavior.” We are not so ready to associate national effects
with cu ltural effects, as discussed later, but the genera l methodological goal is to use the experimental approach to
control for factors that might otherw ise contaminate cross-national comparisons.
2 RPOZ (p.1092) clearly qualify their conclusions, noting that they rest on the assumption that their
experimental controls were adequate and that their results are found to be replicable in related economic env ironments.
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Bargaining behavior appears to vary across nations. What drives these apparent differences? We
reconsider the evidence provided by previous experiments, and undertake some new experiments that
expand the controls for demographics.
We draw several conclusions from re-examining the data from previous experiments conducted in
Japan, Israel, Yugoslavia, and the United States by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir [1991]
(RPOZ).  We confirm their general conclusions that there are significant country differences in both starting
behavior and in round-by-round adaptation. Our conclusions vary in some details, with respect to the
decomposition of the differences into “starting point” versus “adaptive” behavior, but the general conclusion
is the same.  The dynamic effects come out more clearly in the panel regressions reported here than they do
in the round-by-round analysis undertaken in RPOZ. Particularly outstanding is Israel, with a lower average
starting offer than any other country and additional declines in offers over time.  First round offers in Israel
are 9 percentage points below the US, and even further below Japan and Yugoslavia. In Israel we also
observe a higher propensity to accept than in any other country, putting Israel closer to the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium prediction than any other country.  Japan shows the strongest adaptation over time.  In
Yugoslavia offers do not change much over time, but in the US there is a slight increase throughout the
rounds.
It would, however, clearly be incorrect to infer from this general finding that nationality per se is
associated with differences in behavior.1 Instead, it could just be an effect from demographics, other than
nationality, that are not controlled for in the analysis. For example, it could simply be a gender effect, and be
due to differences in the gender mix of the samples in each country. Since RPOZ do not collect information
on individual subject characteristics, it is impossible to tease these two hypotheses apart using their data.
The obvious solution, consistent with the methodological contribution of RPOZ, is to add even
more controls to the design by collecting information on individual characteristics and thereby test these
hypotheses directly.2 We do so, using experimental data collected in the United States and Russia.
We draw two conclusions from our expanded design.
First, there is a country effect even after one controls for individual characteristics. This effect would
3 Experimental economists are  now using panel estimation methods more widely. For example, in the analysis
of ultimatum bargaining data, List and Cherry [2000] and Cooper, Feltovich, Roth and Zwick [2000] use a random-
effects specification such as the one we use. Slonim and Roth [1998; p.580, fn.18] recognized the need for a panel
estimator, but incorrectly claim that the sam ple sizes for  their experiments were too small to use a random  effects
specification.
4 We document some of that literature in the Appendix. Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and
McElreath [2001] examine ultimatum bargaining behavior in 15 “exotic” cultures located in 12 countries, and include
information on demographics when statistically analyzing behavior. Although they claim that individual demographics
were  not significantly related to offers (p.76), they declined to make their raw data available for evaluation (personal
correspondence, Joe Henrich, 6/11/2001). One concern with their results is the wide divergence in experimental
procedures necessitated by the minimal literacy of many of the  subjects and disparate  field conditions. It was precisely
this procedural control that was the main contribution of RPOZ.
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have been missed, however, if one had not used a statistical analysis that controlled for possible country
differences in initial behavior and behavior across rounds, recognizing as well that these are panel data.3
Accounting for the basic dynamics of behavior is critical to drawing the right inference about country effects.
Second, the country effects are more complex than simple additive effects. They interact with basic
demographics, such as gender, in clear ways.  The interaction effects found here have not been observed in
previous experiments for the simple reason that the necessary demographic characteristics of the subjects
were not collected.
Our findings indicate that great care has to be taken when drawing conclusions regarding behavioral
differences due to gender or nationality.  There is a burgeoning literature in experimental economics
examining differences in behavior across nations, as well as a literature examining the effects of gender on
behavior.4  In light of our findings of significant effects at a finer demographic level, it is not surprising that
the observations in this literature are often contradictory, or at least varied. Our results should encourage
experimenters to collect a larger set of demographic characteristics of their subjects, so as to better
approximate the level of detail necessary to capture possible cultural differences.
In section 1 we reconsider the experiments of RPOZ. We examine their data and consider the
effects of allowing for temporal dependence in the analysis of the data, along with the panel structure of the
data, when drawing statistical inferences. In section 2 we describe an extension of their design to include
demographic variables. In section 3 we identify several implications for experimental practice.
1. Previous Experiments
The Ultimatum Game
 In the Ultimatum game one of two players proposes a split of a fixed monetary pie, and the other
player may either accept or reject the proposed split.  If the second player accepts the proposal, the payoffs to
each are determined by the proposed split. If the second player rejects the proposal, they each get nothing. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is for the first player to propose a split that gives him almost
100% of the pie, and for the second player to accept the proposal since any positive offer beats a zero payoff
5 See Güth and T ietz [1990] and Harrison and McCabe [1996] for rev iews of the empirical findings.
6  The data and Stata programs to replicate these calculations can be obtained from
HTTP://DMSWEB .BADM.SC.EDU/LISA/RESEARCH/BA RG AIN .HTM .  Alvin Roth kindly approved the use of the data, which
we obtained  from M iguel Costa-Gomes.
7 Unless otherwise stated, all statements about acceptance or rejection rates are conditional on the level of the
offer.
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for a player that is not satiated in money. The experimental data consistently shows that the average offer to
the second player is substantially greater than predicted, and that the second player often rejects small offers.5
These stylized observations lead to the popular hypothesis that there exists some uncontrolled
element in individual utility, and that individuals care about the payoffs of other players as well as their own
payoffs.  One motivation behind multinational tests of the Ultimatum game is the possibility that such
“altruistic” preferences are culturally determined, and that behavior therefore may vary across nations since
we intuitively expect culture to vary across nations.
Experimental Design
RPOZ ran a series of Ultimatum games in Japan, Israel, Yugoslavia, and the United States.6  They
claim that their data shows significant behavioral differences between subject pools across these nations.
Specifically, they concluded that groups in the United States and Yugoslavia displayed the usual experimental
results of a modal 50-50 split, but that the groups from Japan and Israel were closer to a 60-40 split. They
also found that the propensity to reject lower offers was significantly lower in Japan and Israel.7
Three sessions were conducted in each country. In each of Israel, Japan and Yugoslavia only one
experimenter was used for all sessions. Each of these three experimenters conducted one session in the
United States. Thus it is possible to identify experimenter effects as well as country effects. 
No data were collected on the age, gender or other demographics of the individual participants.
However, some sessions did have identified differences in subject pool. Two differences are noted in RPOZ
(p.1075): in one of the Israeli sessions, and in one of the Yugoslav sessions.
Each subject participated in a session lasting 10 rounds. Each subject faced a new, randomly selected 
opponent in each round. Thus the data consist of balanced panels of individuals responding over each of 10
rounds.
Results  
We begin the analysis by considering the response data. Table 1 presents the results of a random-
effects panel logit estimator applied to the response data. The model estimated here includes the current
offer, a variable identifying the trend across rounds (Lround), dummy variables for the countries, dummy
variables for the experimenters (Shmuel and Masahiro), dummy variables for the two sessions in which there
8 The implicit experimenter is Vesna Prasnikar, and the implicit country is the United States.
9 Figures A1 through A4 of the Appendix provide histograms of these data.
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were some identified differences in sample recruitment (IsDiff and YuDiff), and interaction effects between
the country dummy variables and the trend variable (LrIsr, LrJap, and LrYug). The trend variable is
calculated as the round number minus one, and therefore the country dummy variables capture the first
round effects.  Thus we can draw inferences regarding differences across nations in initial behavior as well as
adaptive, or trend, behavior.
The top panel of Table 1 shows the estimation results, and the second panel shows the marginal
effects, which are the more important results.8 These results refer to the marginal effects of the listed
variables on the probability of an acceptance. Thus a 1% increase in the amount offered in the current period
is associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of acceptance in the current period.  These
results also show the 95% confidence intervals, indicating if some point estimate is statistically significant or
not at that level. An asterisk beside a variable name indicates that the marginal effect is calculated assuming a
discrete change in the value of the variable, since the variable is a dummy.
Compared to the reference country, Responders in Israel have a 20 percentage points higher
propensity to accept offers initially, but follow a similar, increasing trend subsequently.  On the other hand,
Responders in both Japan and Yugoslavia behave similarly to US Responders initially. In Yugoslavia we
observe declining acceptance probabilities. As expected, the current offer has a positive effect on the
probability to accept.
Turning to the offer data, inferences about nationality differences in RPOZ were based primarily on
round 10 behavior.  Modal offers in the US and in Yugoslavia were 50% shares, but they were 40% in Japan
and Israel.  Examination of the distributions of offers in each round allows some preliminary analysis of the
dynamics of behavior.9  In each country there appears to be some variation in the offer distributions over
time, with lower offers being tried out in round 4 through 6 or thereabouts. Examination of the individual
data indicates that there are two broad types of subjects: those that appear to decide on a strategy and vary it
only locally, and those that play around with large variations in their strategy, presumably learning by doing.
This indicates that one should allow for each individual to have different “dynamics” in any statistical model
evaluating these results; we consider this issue later, when examining dynamic specifications.
Table 2 presents the results of a random-effects panel regression in which the dependent variable is
the percentage offer to the Responder. The variables are the same as for the analysis of Responses, except
that the counterpart acceptance by the bargaining partner is not included since it is not known at the time
that the offer is made. The regression allows for individual-specific variances, so that each subject can exhibit
different residual variances in their offer. The coefficients are estimated using feasible Generalized Least
Squares.
10   Their justification for using non-parametric procedures (p.1085) are two-fold. First, they note that the offer
data is asymmetric. This is true, but should not be decisive if one is undertaking an analysis in which the data is to be
conditioned on some explanatory variables. Consider the following thought Monte Carlo experiment.  Take a skewed
random variable defined over a g iven sample size, multiply  it by a constant, add a constant, and then add  a beautifully
white noise term. There is no reason that one cannot examine this skewed dependent variab le with a param etric
statistical method; the key issue is the distribution of the errors, which in this contrived case will be well-behaved even if
the dependent variable is horribly skewed. Of course, if one is undertaking an unconditional analysis then appropriate
methods might include non-parametric tests were it not for other factors (such as the panel structure of the data). But an
unconditional analysis can be dramatically misleading, for the obvious reasons. Second, they note that the samples are
small since they cannot view behavior by the same individual in different rounds as independent and must therefore
examine the data one round at a time. This is true, but argues for a panel analysis that allows for some temporal
correlation in behavior, particularly if it is individual-specific.
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Again we find country differences in both initial behavior and adaptation across rounds. Israel stands
out on the Sender side, just as it did on the Responder side, with initial offers which are 9 percentage points
less than in the reference country, the US.  Sending behavior in Yugoslavia is somewhat more generous than
in the US in the first round. In addition to these first round differences, there are also clear differences in
adaptive behavior. In the US we see additional increases in offers over time. On the other hand, Israel has
additional reductions in offers, leading to an increasing gap in behavior across the two countries since the
Israeli starting offers were already the lowest.  Japan and Yugoslavia also show negative trends over time.
There is a significant experimenter effect from Shmuel Zamir, and the two sessions with identified
differences in subject recruitment exhibited different offers. 
In summary, despite the lower offers in Israel in the early rounds, acceptance rates are higher than in
the US. This leads to a further reduction in the offers from Senders, and to Responders increasing their
propensity to accept. Despite the higher offers in the US in the first round, the lower initial acceptance rates
may have caused Senders to increase their offers over time, with a resulting increase in acceptances.  Our
results suggest that there are several factors at work in  Israel.  The experimenter appeared to be associated
with initial offers that were 4.6 percentage points higher, the specific session with different recruitment
procedures is associated with offers that are 3.1 percentage points lower, and the country effect is associated
with offers that are nearly 9.5 percentage points higher. 
These conclusions differ in their details from those of RPOZ, who conducted no statistical test of
the response data and an unconditional non-parametric test of the offer data.10 However, our results confirm
their general conclusion that these data exhibit country effects. Our analysis adds some statistical structure to
that conclusion, allowing one to pinpoint differences in dynamic paths. Since there could be offsetting
differences in starting point behavior and adaptive behavior, it may be important to keep these separate when
drawing inferences about country effects.
11  The amounts were chosen based on comparative purchasing power for a student in either Russia or the
United States. The values were meant to be large enough to purchase  two reasonable student lunches at a university
cafeteria. While the Ruble was devalued significantly over this time period, the price of an average student lunch at the
university had not changed as much.
12  Each session was conducted in a regular classroom where there was plenty of room for subjects to spread
out for privacy. Subjects were given a folder which contained all the instructions and the  message forms. The language in
the instructions used terms like “buyers” and “sellers,” rather than “Senders” and “Responders”. Proposals were
formulated in terms of number of “tokens,” each of which had the same value to both players. The total number of
tokens that could be  divided up between the two players in each round was 1000. After the first p layers had made their
proposals, the forms were collected, collated, and handed back to their partners. In order to keep the designation private,
we collected and handed back forms to all players every time we went around the room. The player who was not making
a decision was asked to report a guess of what decision his partner was making. All players went through a practice
round together before starting. The sessions lasted approximately 1¼ hours. The time required for each session varied
slightly , based on the subjects’ understanding of the game, the level of difficulty in filling out the required dem ographic
questionnaire, and the size and structure of the classroom in which the experiment was held.  A complete set of
instructions, as well as the data and the Stata  code for our analyses can be found at
HTTP://DMSWEB .BADM.SC.EDU/LISA/RESEARCH/BA RG AIN .HTM .
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2. An Expanded Experimental Design
We undertook a series of Ultimatum game experiments in Russia and the United States in order to
test for the effect of demographic variables in addition to the country effects of RPOZ. The main extension
was to collect standard information on socio-demographics of each individual subject.
Sixty subjects were recruited from the student population at Moscow Institute of Electronics
Technology (MIET).  Most of these students were business students at the Zelenograd Business College at
MIET.  There were two sessions, one in November 1994 and one in March 1995. Each session included 30
subjects.  In each session half of the subjects were designated buyers (making offers) and half sellers
(accepting or rejecting offers). Subjects made decisions in 5 consecutive bargaining rounds, maintaining their
designation as buyers or sellers but playing against different, anonymous opponents in each round.  At the
end of the experiment one of the rounds was selected at random to determine actual payments. The
buyer/seller designation was private information throughout the experiment. Subjects were paid 7000 Rubles
for participating and they bargained over 14,000 Rubles in each round during the first session. In the second
session subjects were paid 8,000 Rubles for participating and bargained over 16,000 Rubles.11
In the United States the same procedures were used in three sessions of 20 subjects each for a total
of 60 subjects. These subjects were recruited from the University of South Carolina (USC) and paid $5 for
participating while bargaining over $10.12
The same experimenter (Hirsch) conducted all experiments, so there should be no experimenter
effects across sessions.
Results
Table 3 and 4  show the results of a panel logit regression model for the response data, and Table 5
defines each of the variables used. Table 3 includes a fixed country effect variable (Russia), whereas Table 4
13  This difference derives from the marginal effects of variables SlavR and OraceR. There is no variation in
ethnic background for either men or women in Russia. All Responders are of Slavic ethnicity . In the US there is  some
variation, however.
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shows a specification with variables that interact country with gender and ethnicity.
The fixed country effect in Table 3 is not significant, but there is a significant gender effect with male
acceptance rates being 24 percentage points higher than females (coefficient on maleR), and acceptance rates
of participants of Slavic ethnicity 44 percentage points less than Other Whites.13  A trend variable (Lround) is
included, so the dummy variables capture first round effects.  Since the trend variable is only significant at the
9.5% level, however, the first round effects tend to persist throughout the rounds.  
As we break these aggregate effects down into interaction effects in Table 4, we see that the gender
effect is due to Russian females (who are all of Slavic ethnicity) having significantly lower acceptance rates
than any other white ethnic group. The coefficients on Russian males (rRuSlavm) and on US whites (rUSwhf
and rUSwhm) are each positive and significant in relation to the reference group, Russian females.
Acceptance rates of Russian males are 38 percentage points higher, and in the US the acceptance rates are 37
and 50 percentage points higher for females and males, respectively.  There appears to no gender effect in the
US, since the coefficients of rUSwhf and rUSwhm are similar, but in fact they are statistically different at the
3.4% level since they are each estimated so precisely. In the US, white males accept more often than white
females.  There also appears to be some effect correlated with ethnicity, since white males in the US have
somewhat higher acceptance rates than participants of non-white ethnic US groups, which include both
genders. The difference in the marginal effects of rUSwhm and rUSAA (rUSorace) is 10 (15) percentage
points, and these are statistically significant differences.
Tables 6 and 7 present the results from panel regressions in which the dependent variable is the
percentage offer. In these regressions we control for nationality, gender and ethnicity, but not for interactions
between them. Table 7 separates initial effects from adaptation by including a trend variable, Lround. We
draw two major conclusions from these two regressions. 
First, if we had not controlled for differences between initial behavior and adaptation across rounds, we would have
drawn the false conclusion that there was no country effect.  The coefficient on Russia in Table 6 is not significantly
different from zero. We do find that Russian bargaining behavior is different from American behavior in
Table 7, however, where the trend variable Lround is included. Initial offers are lower in Russia than in the
US by 7.6 percentage points.  The regression model also includes a trend variable interacted with the country
dummy variable, LrRus, capturing the trend in Russia. Russian offers remain fairly stable across rounds, but
US offers increase across rounds by 0.6 percentage points per round. Hence, distinguishing between initial
behavior and adaptation can be important for the inferences one draws about possible country effects. This
result is consistent with our re-analysis of the RPOZ data, where the US showed high initial offers and then
14   We are restricted in our analysis by limited variation in certain demographics in the data collected. These restrictions are
discussed in the Appendix. 
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further increases over time. Both findings are confirmed in the new experiments. 
Second, there are significant behavioral differences on a much finer detailed demographic classification level than the
country and gender levels. The finest level we can look at, given the data collected, is the three-way interaction
between country, gender, and ethnicity.14 We find that women in Russia offer significantly more than any
other group, at least in the first period. This is shown in Table 8 where the coefficient on each of the
demographic-specific first round effects are negative and significant in relation to the reference group,
Russian females.  All Russian females are again of Slavic ethnicity. However, some male Senders in Russia are
of non-Slavic White ethnicity. Other first period differences include lower offers by Russian males than by
US males. We find no significant first period effects based on ethnicity among Russian males, or either
ethnicity or gender in the US. We do not find that Russian males adjust over time to close the gap in offers
compared to Russian women, but we observe an increase in offers over time by both women and men in the
US.  We therefore conclude that observed behavioral differences are not correlated with country or gender, but rather with
the interaction between the two. In particular, we observe Russian women offering more and accepting less
frequently than other groups.
3. Implications
We find significant differences in behavior due to nationality and gender. In the RPOZ data, offers
in Israel start out lower than elsewhere, and Responders are more willing to accept such offers, leading to
further reductions in offers but increases in acceptances.  These subjects act more in accordance with the
predictions of game theory, and move closer to those predictions over time compared to participants in other
countries. Russian women, on the other hand, offer more than Russian males or US participants of either
gender, and are also less willing to accept lower offers. This group acts less in accordance with theory, and
does not appear to move closer to theoretical predictions over time. Thus we find a country and gender
interaction effect when we have the data to allow it to be identified.
US offers are observed to increase in both sets of experiments.  Acceptance rates in the RPOZ
experiments increase in response to these changes in offers, but this is not so in the present series of
experiments. 
Two methodological issues arise from our reconsideration of the bargaining experiments of RPOZ
and from our new experimental data. First, how should one evaluate data in which the subjects respond over
multiple periods? Second, how should one draw inferences about the effects of culture on bargaining
behavior?
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Temporal Dependence
Given the popularity of Ground Hog Day experimental designs, in which the subjects are
reincarnated every round in the same role against different opponents, statistical as well as behavioral issues
deserve more systematic methodological examination by experimenters and those interested in experimental
data. Our analysis of RPOZ data, and of the new experimental data, indicate that both initial behavior and
changes over time deserve careful attention. Neither can be assumed to be a definitive and best measure of
behavior on its own. 
“Culture”
It is tempting, but incorrect, to equate the effect of culture on bargaining behavior with the effect of
a country dummy variable. The word “culture” connotes systematic beliefs and modes of behavior that are
associated with a group of individuals. One can have a Swedish culture, and even an Australian culture, but
one can also have a “geek culture” or a “gay culture.”  In general there are many characteristics of individuals
that can be used to identify systematic beliefs and patterns of behavior, and nationality is just one such
characteristic.
Moreover, it is completely plausible that some of these characteristics might interact. Thus the effect
of gender in one country could be very different from the effect of gender in another country.  In other
words, the differential effect of gender could be a reflection of the effects of “national culture.” RPOZ
(p.1092) note  that there were differences in the age and gender mix of their subject pool in different
countries, reflecting differences in national cultures with respect to attendance at higher-education and the
necessity of military duty.  The possibility of interactions makes it even more difficult to claim that culture
can be reduced to a simple country dummy variable, or identified by unconditioned bilateral comparisons of
distributions of behavior between two countries.
One upshot of these considerations is that one should be careful to think about country effects in
experimental designs as residual effects, after one has controlled for other effects. This conclusion is akin to
thinking of a dummy variable for the country of the experiment as simply picking up the effect of  “whatever
is in the water (or beer)” that makes people behave differently. That is, it picks up those factors in the
country that affect behavior beyond those that are already included, such as age and sex in our expanded
design.
Another conclusion is that we should best think of the effect of national culture in both conditional
and unconditional terms. This conclusion is just a plea for cleaner language use, so that we do not assume
implicitly that sex or age effects are biological when they could be cultural.
-10-
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Table 1: Panel Logit Analysis of Responses From RPOZ data
Random-effects logit                            Number of obs      =      1160
Group variable (i) : SellerID                   Number of groups   =       116
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:     =        10
                                                Wald chi2(12)      =    154.64
Log likelihood  = -463.01285                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
      accept |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      Lround |   .1325128   .0692626     1.91   0.056    -.0032395     .268265
       LrIsr |   .0674633   .1023288     0.66   0.510    -.1330975     .268024
       LrJap |  -.0406336   .0962193    -0.42   0.673      -.22922    .1479528
       LrYug |  -.1732518   .0908014    -1.91   0.056    -.3512193    .0047157
       offer |   .2098177   .0173104    12.12   0.000       .17589    .2437453
      Israel |   2.795581    .986364     2.83   0.005     .8623433    4.728819
       Japan |   .5164791    1.12793     0.46   0.647    -1.694223    2.727181
    Yugoslav |   .0825151   .8017804     0.10   0.918    -1.488946    1.653976
      Shmuel |  -.8619025   .9831815    -0.88   0.381    -2.788903    1.065098
    Masahiro |   .1253034   1.077149     0.12   0.907     -1.98587    2.236477
      IsDiff |   .6265365   1.100688     0.57   0.569    -1.530772    2.783845
      YuDiff |   .8448886   .6947519     1.22   0.224    -.5168001    2.206577
       _cons |  -7.550585   .9328876    -8.09   0.000    -9.379011   -5.722159
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /lnsig2u |    1.55309   .2924744                      .9798502    2.126329
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |   2.173948   .3179121                      1.632194    2.895519
         rho |   .8253595   .0421576                      .7270785     .893436
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marginal Effects
      y  = Pr(accept=1 assuming u_i=0) (predict, pu0) =  .88507833
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
  Lround |   .0134785      .00731    1.84   0.065  -.000858  .027815   4.50000
   LrIsr |    .006862      .01043    0.66   0.511  -.013577  .027301   1.16379
   LrJap |   -.004133      .00981   -0.42   0.673  -.023356   .01509   1.12500
   LrYug |  -.0176223      .00963   -1.83   0.067  -.036494   .00125   1.16379
   offer |   .0213415      .00347    6.15   0.000   .014539  .028144   40.0914
  Israel*|   .1950003      .06504    3.00   0.003   .067517  .322483   .258621
   Japan*|   .0477182      .09689    0.49   0.622  -.142191  .237627   .250000
Yugoslav*|   .0082658      .07916    0.10   0.917  -.146876  .163408   .258621
  Shmuel*|  -.0984775      .12811   -0.77   0.442  -.349571  .152616   .336207
Masahiro*|   .0125481      .10573    0.12   0.906  -.194687  .219784   .336207
  IsDiff*|   .0522848      .07383    0.71   0.479   -.09241  .196979   .086207
  YuDiff*|   .0659403      .03994    1.65   0.099  -.012332  .144212   .086207
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Legend to Regression Variables for RPOZ data
offer Current offer
Israel Dummy variable for participants in Israel
Japan Dummy variable for participants in Japan
Yugoslav Dummy variable for participants in Yugoslavia
Shmuel Dummy variable for sessions ran by Shmuel Zamir
Masahiro Dummy variable for sessions ran by Masahiro Okuno-Fujiware
IsDiff Dummy variable for session in Israel with reported subject pool difference
YuDiff Dummy variable for session in Yugoslavia with reported subject pool difference
Lround Round - 1
LrIsr Interaction Israel × Lround
LrJap Interaction Japan × Lround
LrYug Interaction Yugoslavia × Lround
LrUS Interaction US × Lround
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Table 2: Panel Regression of Offers From RPOZ data
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Panels:        heteroskedastic
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1)
Estimated covariances      =       116          Number of obs      =      1160
Estimated autocorrelations =       116          Number of groups   =       116
Estimated coefficients     =        12          No. of time periods=        10
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =    256.41
Log likelihood             = -3278.214          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       offer |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      Lround |    .196215   .0669099     2.93   0.003     .0650739     .327356
       LrIsr |  -.3945224   .0775614    -5.09   0.000    -.5465399    -.242505
       LrJap |  -.5250066    .111358    -4.71   0.000    -.7432642   -.3067489
       LrYug |  -.2571683   .0889815    -2.89   0.004    -.4315688   -.0827678
      Israel |  -9.450891   1.238363    -7.63   0.000    -11.87804   -7.023745
       Japan |   1.902307   1.106313     1.72   0.086    -.2660266    4.070641
    Yugoslav |   2.194978   .9793229     2.24   0.025     .2755407    4.114416
      Shmuel |   4.556115   1.478165     3.08   0.002     1.658964    7.453265
    Masahiro |  -1.891286   1.329887    -1.42   0.155    -4.497816    .7152444
      IsDiff |  -3.139483   .7625018    -4.12   0.000    -4.633959   -1.645007
      YuDiff |  -3.606967   1.170608    -3.08   0.002    -5.901316   -1.312617
       _cons |   42.33046   .7458536    56.75   0.000     40.86862    43.79231
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 3: Logit Panel Regression of Acceptance Propensities, No Interaction Variables, N ew D ata
Random-effects logit                            Number of obs      =       295
Group variable (i) : idR                        Number of groups   =        59
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:     =         5
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =     68.54
Log likelihood  =  -110.4898                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     acceptr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     OfferrP |   .1668792    .021587     7.73   0.000     .1245695     .209189
      Russia |   .5902302   1.389766     0.42   0.671    -2.133661    3.314121
       SlavR |  -3.518508   1.393229    -2.53   0.012    -6.249188    -.787829
         AAR |  -.6210898   .9277446    -0.67   0.503    -2.439436    1.197256
      OraceR |  -.6509949   1.581655    -0.41   0.681    -3.750981    2.448992
       maleR |   1.361665   .4904861     2.78   0.006     .4003303       2.323
      Lround |  -.3011987   .1797368    -1.68   0.094    -.6534763    .0510789
       LrRus |   .2637451   .2474485     1.07   0.286    -.2212451    .7487353
     ParIncR |  -.5698218   1.130757    -0.50   0.614    -2.786064     1.64642
      Pinc1R |   .8615277   .6029257     1.43   0.153    -.3201849     2.04324
      Pinc2R |   1.529184   .8614682     1.78   0.076    -.1592631     3.21763
    YrsWorkR |  -.2362857   .1456984    -1.62   0.105    -.5218494     .049278
       mgovR |   .1250167   .5951862     0.21   0.834    -1.041527     1.29156
       mbusR |    .003532   .4493905     0.01   0.994    -.8772572    .8843212
       fbusR |  -.0700462   .5300263    -0.13   0.895    -1.108879    .9687864
       fgovR |   .3946739   .6504775     0.61   0.544    -.8802385    1.669586
    Under18R |  -.0409632   .6840124    -0.06   0.952    -1.381603    1.299677
        NhhR |  -.1643719   .1972384    -0.83   0.405    -.5509521    .2222083
     HHinc1R |   .2441122   .5970312     0.41   0.683    -.9260475    1.414272
     HHinc2R |   .5548698   .8263362     0.67   0.502    -1.064719    2.174459
    StudentR |  -.6692234   .7150239    -0.94   0.349    -2.070644    .7321976
    ScienceR |  -.9074426   .9693929    -0.94   0.349    -2.807418    .9925325
        BusR |   .5512337   .6027227     0.91   0.360     -.630081    1.732548
    UrbanChR |   2.077142   .6761807     3.07   0.002      .751852    3.402432
       _cons |  -4.713568   1.851739    -2.55   0.011    -8.342909   -1.084226
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /lnsig2u |        -14   385.4001                     -769.3704    741.3704
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |   .0009119   .1757197                      8.6e-168    9.7e+160
         rho |   2.53e-07   .0000296                             0           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marginal effects
      y  = Pr(acceptr=1 assuming u_i=0) (predict, pu0) =  .74982824
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 OfferrP |   .0313042      .00389    8.05   0.000   .023678  .038931   36.3017
  Russia*|   .1107859      .26088    0.42   0.671  -.400539   .62211   .508475
   SlavR*|  -.5782312      .18446   -3.13   0.002   -.93976 -.216703   .542373
     AAR*|  -.1307966      .21266   -0.62   0.539  -.547603   .28601   .067797
  OraceR*|  -.1394155      .37353   -0.37   0.709   -.87153  .592699   .016949
   maleR*|   .2405688      .08047    2.99   0.003   .082848   .39829   .423729
  Lround |  -.0565006      .03382   -1.67   0.095  -.122795  .009794   2.00000
   LrRus |   .0494748       .0467    1.06   0.289   -.04205  .140999   1.01695
 ParIncR*|  -.0940278      .16193   -0.58   0.561  -.411407  .223351   .915254
  Pinc1R*|    .156968      .10677    1.47   0.142  -.052292  .366228   .440678
  Pinc2R*|   .2508148      .12229    2.05   0.040   .011132  .490497   .338983
YrsWorkR |  -.0443239       .0273   -1.62   0.104  -.097826  .009179   2.06780
   mgovR*|   .0228882       .1067    0.21   0.830  -.186249  .232025   .118644
   mbusR*|   .0006624      .08424    0.01   0.994  -.164451  .165776   .322034
   fbusR*|  -.0131604      .09963   -0.13   0.895   -.20843  .182109   .454237
   fgovR*|   .0693752      .10846    0.64   0.522  -.143202  .281953   .186441
Under18R*|  -.0077306      .12988   -0.06   0.953    -.2623  .246839   .203390
    NhhR |  -.0308338      .03684   -0.84   0.403  -.103032  .041364   2.35593
 HHinc1R*|   .0441127       .1037    0.43   0.671   -.15914  .247365   .203390
 HHinc2R*|   .0968369      .13276    0.73   0.466  -.163363  .357037   .254237
StudentR*|  -.1106911      .10419   -1.06   0.288  -.314896  .093514   .847458
ScienceR*|  -.1975807      .23388   -0.84   0.398  -.655975  .260814   .084746
    BusR*|   .1104277      .12785    0.86   0.388  -.140149  .361005   .762712
UrbanChR*|   .4563154      .14547    3.14   0.002   .171197  .741434   .796610
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Table 4: Logit Panel Regression of Acceptance Propensities, Interaction Variables, New Data
Random-effects logit                            Number of obs      =       295
Group variable (i) : idR                        Number of groups   =        59
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:     =         5
                                                Wald chi2(26)      =     67.26
Log likelihood  = -107.68092                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     acceptr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     OfferrP |   .1736032   .0225002     7.72   0.000     .1295036    .2177028
    rRuSlavm |   3.296455   1.058415     3.11   0.002     1.221999    5.370912
      rUSwhf |   3.489291   1.111465     3.14   0.002      1.31086    5.667721
      rUSwhm |   5.864796   1.262976     4.64   0.000     3.389409    8.340183
       rUSAA |   2.998942   1.142851     2.62   0.009     .7589958    5.238889
    rUSorace |   2.278033   1.678946     1.36   0.175    -1.012641    5.568706
     rLrRusm |  -.5168303   .3013116    -1.72   0.086     -1.10739    .0737296
      rLrRuw |   .2949979   .2074768     1.42   0.155    -.1116491     .701645
     rLrUswm |  -.6135886   .3386717    -1.81   0.070    -1.277373    .0501958
     rLrUswf |  -.0559864   .2826991    -0.20   0.843    -.6100665    .4980937
     ParIncR |  -.6231383   .9243139    -0.67   0.500     -2.43476    1.188484
      Pinc1R |   1.162531   .6495145     1.79   0.073     -.110494    2.435556
      Pinc2R |   1.846761   .9084911     2.03   0.042     .0661509    3.627371
    YrsWorkR |  -.2497837    .144521    -1.73   0.084    -.5330396    .0334722
       mgovR |   .2039651   .6094743     0.33   0.738    -.9905827    1.398513
       mbusR |   .0171822   .4565193     0.04   0.970    -.8775792    .9119437
       fbusR |  -.1042399   .5428562    -0.19   0.848    -1.168218    .9597387
       fgovR |    .482703   .6761699     0.71   0.475    -.8425657    1.807972
    Under18R |   .0156045   .6566518     0.02   0.981    -1.271409    1.302618
        NhhR |  -.1432067   .2041119    -0.70   0.483    -.5432587    .2568453
     HHinc1R |   .1848266    .612407     0.30   0.763    -1.015469    1.385122
     HHinc2R |    .509053   .8069442     0.63   0.528    -1.072529    2.090635
    StudentR |  -.9735378    .686356    -1.42   0.156    -2.318771    .3716953
    ScienceR |  -.9506288   .9853863    -0.96   0.335    -2.881951     .980693
        BusR |   .4956819   .6167721     0.80   0.422    -.7131693    1.704533
    UrbanChR |   2.346022   .6783102     3.46   0.001     1.016558    3.675486
       _cons |  -8.913376    1.72302    -5.17   0.000    -12.29043   -5.536319
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /lnsig2u |        -14   388.3557                     -775.1632    747.1632
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |   .0009119   .1770673                      4.7e-169    1.8e+162
         rho |   2.53e-07   .0000298                             0           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marginal effects
      y  = Pr(acceptr=1 assuming u_i=0) (predict, pu0) =  .74867107
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 OfferrP |   .0326656      .00418    7.82   0.000   .024475  .040857   36.3017
rRuSlavm*|    .384655      .08153    4.72   0.000   .224852  .544458   .220339
  rUSwhf*|   .3722449      .07279    5.11   0.000   .229585  .514904   .186441
  rUSwhm*|   .4976399      .07208    6.90   0.000   .356373  .638906   .186441
   rUSAA*|    .271386      .04807    5.65   0.000    .17718  .365592   .067797
rUSorace*|   .2241393      .06613    3.39   0.001   .094529   .35375   .016949
 rLrRusm |  -.0972482       .0561   -1.73   0.083  -.207211  .012715   .440678
  rLrRuw |   .0555076      .03941    1.41   0.159  -.021738  .132753   .576271
 rLrUswm |  -.1154545      .06411   -1.80   0.072  -.241104  .010195   .372881
 rLrUswf |  -.0105346      .05317   -0.20   0.843  -.114743  .093674   .372881
 ParIncR*|  -.1018838      .12848   -0.79   0.428  -.353705  .149937   .915254
  Pinc1R*|   .2100198      .11304    1.86   0.063  -.011535  .431575   .440678
  Pinc2R*|   .2955667      .11869    2.49   0.013   .062935  .528198   .338983
YrsWorkR |      -.047      .02719   -1.73   0.084  -.100283  .006283   2.06780
   mgovR*|   .0368754      .10575    0.35   0.727  -.170384  .244135   .118644
   mbusR*|   .0032281      .08563    0.04   0.970   -.16461  .171066   .322034
   fbusR*|  -.0196594      .10269   -0.19   0.848   -.22093  .181611   .454237
   fgovR*|   .0838513      .10686    0.78   0.433  -.125597    .2933   .186441
Under18R*|   .0029294      .12297    0.02   0.981   -.23808  .243939   .203390
    NhhR |  -.0269462      .03836   -0.70   0.482   -.10213  .048238   2.35593
 HHinc1R*|   .0338184      .10865    0.31   0.756  -.179123   .24676   .203390
 HHinc2R*|   .0896897      .13354    0.67   0.502  -.172043  .351422   .254237
StudentR*|  -.1520438      .08648   -1.76   0.079  -.321545  .017457   .847458
ScienceR*|  -.2083819       .2363   -0.88   0.378  -.671525  .254761   .084746
    BusR*|   .0989812      .13216    0.75   0.454  -.160054  .358016   .762712
UrbanChR*|   .5127013      .13607    3.77   0.000   .246013   .77939   .796610
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Table 5: Legend to Regression Variables for New Experiments
Variable Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
acceptr          Acceptance of proposal by Receiver
OfferrP           Received offer as percent of pie
OffersP            Sender offer as percent of pie
accepts           Acceptance of proposal of Sender
Russia           Moscow Institute of Electronics Technology (Russia)
 
Sender variables
maleS           Male
Under18S           Age under 18
NhhS             Number in household
whiteS             White including Slavic
white2S            White, not including Slavic
SlavS           Slavic white
AAS               African-American
OraceS            Other race
HHinc1S            Household income between $50k and $100k
HHinc2S           Household income over $100k
Pinc1S            Parental income between $50k and $100k
Pinc2S            Parental income over $100k
StudentS           Student is main occupation
ScienceS           Field of study is sciences
BusS              Field of study is business
YrsWorkS          Years of work experience
UrbanChS           Urban childhood environment
fbusS              Father’s occupation is Business
fgovS              Father’s occupation is Government
mbusS              Mother’s occupation is Business
mgovS              Mother’s occupation is Government
Responder variables
maleR          Male
Under18R            Age under 18
NhhR              Number in household
whiteR             White including slavic
white2R             White, not including slavic
SlavR               Slavic white
AAR                 African-American
OraceR              Other race
HHinc1R             Household income between $50k and $100k
HHinc2R             Household income over $100k
Pinc1R             Parental income between $50k and $100k
Pinc2R             Parental income over $100k
StudentR            Student is main occupation
ScienceR            Field of study is sciences
BusR               Field of study is business
YrsWorkR         Years of work experience
UrbanChR           Urban childhood environment
fbusR               Father’s occupation is Business
fgovR              Father’s occupation is Government
mbusR               Mother’s occupation is Business
mgovR              Mother’s occupation is Government
Constructed variables
Lround Round - 1
LofferR lagged offer received by Responder
rRuSlavm Interaction Russia × Slavic × Male for Responders
rUSwhf Interaction US × White × Female for Responders
rUSwhm Interaction US × White × Male for Responders
rUSAA Interaction US × African-American for Responders
rUSorace Interaction US × Other Race for Responders
rLrRusm Interaction Russia × Slavic × Male × Lround for Responders
rLrRuw Interaction Russia × Female × Lround for Responders
rLrUswm Interaction US × White × Male × Lround for Responders
rLrUswf Interaction US × White × Female × Lround for Responders
LrRus Interaction Russia × Lround for Senders
RuSlavm Interaction Russia × Slavic × Male for Senders
RuWh2m Interaction Russia × Non-Slavic White × Male for Senders
Uswhf Interaction US × White × Female for Senders
Uswhm Interaction US × White × Male for Senders
USAA Interaction US × African-American for Senders
Usorace Interaction US × Other Race for Senders
LrRusm Interaction Russia × Slavic × Male × Lround for Senders
LrRuwm Interaction Russia × Non-Slavic × Male × Lround for Senders
LrRuw Interaction Russia × Female × Lround for Senders
LrUswm Interaction US × White × Male × Lround for Senders
LrUswf Interaction US × White × Female × Lround for Senders
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Table 6: Panel Regression of Offers, No Trend Variables, New Data
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Panels:        heteroskedastic
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1)
Estimated covariances      =        59          Number of obs      =       295
Estimated autocorrelations =        59          Number of groups   =        59
Estimated coefficients     =        22          No. of time periods=         5
                                                Wald chi2(21)      =    271.45
Log likelihood             = -877.7369          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     OffersP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      Russia |   .8160234   5.759847     0.14   0.887    -10.47307    12.10512
       SlavS |    2.60498   3.932023     0.66   0.508    -5.101644     10.3116
         AAS |  -2.537278   4.585674    -0.55   0.580    -11.52503    6.450479
      OraceS |  -27.29137    3.89543    -7.01   0.000    -34.92627   -19.65647
       maleS |  -5.943215   2.244845    -2.65   0.008    -10.34303   -1.543399
     ParIncS |  -3.942722   3.303308    -1.19   0.233    -10.41709    2.531642
      Pinc1S |  -4.906591    2.58664    -1.90   0.058    -9.976312    .1631298
      Pinc2S |  -1.946884   2.608157    -0.75   0.455    -7.058778    3.165009
    YrsWorkS |  -.6932632   .6446433    -1.08   0.282    -1.956741    .5702145
       mgovS |  -3.569329   1.961774    -1.82   0.069    -7.414335    .2756774
       mbusS |  -5.960906   2.330835    -2.56   0.011    -10.52926   -1.392553
       fbusS |  -2.164924   2.823866    -0.77   0.443    -7.699601    3.369752
       fgovS |  -2.898531   3.238378    -0.90   0.371    -9.245635    3.448574
    Under18S |   6.397032    1.93449     3.31   0.001     2.605502    10.18856
        NhhS |   .5460675   .8334561     0.66   0.512    -1.087476    2.179611
     HHinc1S |  -3.662156   2.491751    -1.47   0.142    -8.545899    1.221586
     HHinc2S |  -6.222375   2.484832    -2.50   0.012    -11.09256   -1.352194
    StudentS |   10.34524    3.91189     2.64   0.008     2.678082    18.01241
    ScienceS |   1.082212   3.653457     0.30   0.767    -6.078432    8.242856
        BusS |   2.876168   2.992978     0.96   0.337     -2.98996    8.742297
    UrbanChS |   3.327175   2.312595     1.44   0.150    -1.205428    7.859779
       _cons |   34.92327   8.028984     4.35   0.000     19.18675    50.65979
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 7: Panel Regression of Offers, Trend Variables, New Data
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Panels:        heteroskedastic
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1)
Estimated covariances      =        59          Number of obs      =       295
Estimated autocorrelations =        59          Number of groups   =        59
Estimated coefficients     =        24          No. of time periods=         5
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =    698.22
Log likelihood             = -872.0425          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     OffersP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      Russia |  -7.560478   3.755165    -2.01   0.044    -14.92047   -.2004899
       SlavS |   5.588028   3.134596     1.78   0.075    -.5556672    11.73172
         AAS |  -7.386724   3.821949    -1.93   0.053    -14.87761    .1041589
      OraceS |  -29.83336   3.657071    -8.16   0.000    -37.00108   -22.66563
       maleS |  -9.282665   1.724964    -5.38   0.000    -12.66353   -5.901798
      Lround |   .6351695   .1421449     4.47   0.000     .3565706    .9137684
       LrRus |  -.5945854   .2887509    -2.06   0.039    -1.160527   -.0286441
     ParIncS |  -3.159669    2.85854    -1.11   0.269    -8.762305    2.442967
      Pinc1S |  -2.888466   2.491931    -1.16   0.246    -7.772561    1.995628
      Pinc2S |   .3285128   2.087102     0.16   0.875    -3.762131    4.419157
    YrsWorkS |  -1.397748    .504275    -2.77   0.006    -2.386109   -.4093877
       mgovS |  -2.974372    1.86463    -1.60   0.111     -6.62898    .6802367
       mbusS |  -3.577331   1.975634    -1.81   0.070    -7.449503    .2948402
       fbusS |  -2.659868   2.390862    -1.11   0.266    -7.345872    2.026135
       fgovS |  -4.068933   2.707817    -1.50   0.133    -9.376157    1.238292
    Under18S |   6.387343   1.976398     3.23   0.001     2.513675    10.26101
        NhhS |   .9602316   .5510837     1.74   0.081    -.1198727    2.040336
     HHinc1S |  -2.212397   1.871107    -1.18   0.237      -5.8797    1.454906
     HHinc2S |  -2.420546   1.760076    -1.38   0.169    -5.870232     1.02914
    StudentS |   9.610038   3.735193     2.57   0.010     2.289195    16.93088
    ScienceS |   2.388784   3.297896     0.72   0.469    -4.074973    8.852541
        BusS |   5.018328    2.27811     2.20   0.028     .5533139    9.483342
    UrbanChS |    5.88373   1.888891     3.11   0.002     2.181571    9.585889
       _cons |   34.18936   7.178487     4.76   0.000     20.11978    48.25894
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 8: Panel Regression of Offers, Trend Variables and Demographic Interaction Variables, New Data
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Panels:        heteroskedastic
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1)
Estimated covariances      =        59          Number of obs      =       295
Estimated autocorrelations =        59          Number of groups   =        59
Estimated coefficients     =        28          No. of time periods=         5
                                                Wald chi2(27)      =    548.97
Log likelihood             = -888.5808          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     OffersP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     RuSlavm |  -14.29497   2.474012    -5.78   0.000    -19.14395      -9.446
      RuWh2m |  -16.37036   4.477184    -3.66   0.000    -25.14548   -7.595238
       USwhf |  -8.121571   2.785545    -2.92   0.004    -13.58114   -2.662003
       USwhm |  -7.800556   2.704492    -2.88   0.004    -13.10126   -2.499849
        USAA |   -9.22744   3.841978    -2.40   0.016    -16.75758   -1.697301
     USorace |  -35.77878   3.803684    -9.41   0.000    -43.23386   -28.32369
      LrRusm |  -.3489942   .3193608    -1.09   0.274    -.9749298    .2769414
      LrRuwm |   2.276743   1.377464     1.65   0.098    -.4230361    4.976522
       LrRuw |    -.07856   .4087826    -0.19   0.848    -.8797591    .7226391
      LrUswm |   1.449248   .2573609     5.63   0.000     .9448296    1.953666
      LrUswf |   2.119032   .7026223     3.02   0.003     .7419176    3.496146
     ParIncS |  -4.441806   2.648825    -1.68   0.094    -9.633407    .7497955
      Pinc1S |   1.261674   2.312481     0.55   0.585    -3.270705    5.794053
      Pinc2S |  -.5293646   1.719689    -0.31   0.758    -3.899893    2.841164
    YrsWorkS |  -1.243773   .3869243    -3.21   0.001    -2.002131   -.4854158
       mgovS |   -.834584   1.950445    -0.43   0.669    -4.657387    2.988219
       mbusS |   -3.19065   1.851868    -1.72   0.085    -6.820244    .4389451
       fbusS |  -1.459535   2.399609    -0.61   0.543    -6.162682    3.243612
       fgovS |  -1.212795   2.446052    -0.50   0.620    -6.006969    3.581379
    Under18S |   6.355412    1.86049     3.42   0.001     2.708917    10.00191
        NhhS |    1.44194   .6113076     2.36   0.018     .2437995    2.640081
     HHinc1S |  -5.045016    2.20491    -2.29   0.022     -9.36656   -.7234726
     HHinc2S |  -1.557939   1.938183    -0.80   0.422    -5.356708    2.240829
    StudentS |   12.05427   3.710113     3.25   0.001     4.782578    19.32595
    ScienceS |   5.330204   3.075855     1.73   0.083    -.6983613    11.35877
        BusS |   3.375985   2.402298     1.41   0.160    -1.332432    8.084402
    UrbanChS |   5.097054   1.593931     3.20   0.001     1.973007    8.221102
       _cons |   30.59483   6.036202     5.07   0.000     18.76409    42.42556
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix: Additional Results (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Previous Experiments
There is a large literature examining the differences in behavior in economics experiments across
countries, and the differences in bargaining behavior in terms of gender effects. Without any expectation of
providing an exhaustive list, we note the following references which have influenced our design and analyses:
Andreoni, James, and Vesterlund, Lise, “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism”, Unpublished
Manuscript, 1998.
Bolton, Gary E., and Zwick, Rami, “Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 1995.
Brandts, J.; Saijo, T.; and Schram, A., “A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary
Contribution Mechanisms,” Unpublished Manuscript, 1998.
Buchan, N.R.; Johnson, E.J.; and Croson, R.T.A., “Country, Culture, and Communication: Extra-Economic
Incentives Toward Economic Cooperation,” Unpublished Manuscript, 1997.
Burlando, R., and Hey, J.D.,  “Do Anglo-Saxsons Free-ride More?” Journal of Public Economics, 64, 1997,41-60.
Cason, T.N.; Saijo, T.; and Yamato, T., “Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision
Experiments: An International Comparison,” Unpublished Manuscript, 1997.
Eckel, Catherine C., and Grossman, Philip, “Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games,” Unpublished
Manuscript, 1992.
Eckel, Catherine C., and Grossman, Philip J., “Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 16, 1996, 181-91.
Eckel, Catherine C., and Grossman, Philip, “Are Women less Selfish than Men? Evidence from Dictator
Experiments”, Economic Journal, 1997.
Eckel, Catherine C., and Grossman, Philip, “The Relative Price of Fairness: Gender Differences in a
Punishment Game”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 30, 1996, 143-58.
Hayashi, N.; Ostrom, E.; Walker, J.; and Yamagishi, T., “Reciprocity, Trust, and the Illusion of Control: A
Cross-Societal Study,” Unpublished Manuscript, 1997.
Saijo, T., and Nakamura, H., “The ‘Spite’ Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39, 1995, 535-560.
Willer, David and Szmatka, Jacek, “Cross-National Experimental Investigations of Elementary Theory:
Implications for the Generality of the Theory and the Autonomy of Social Structures,” Advances in
Group Processes, vol. 10, 1993, 37-81.
Yamagishi, T., “Exit From the Group as an Individualistic Solution to the Public Good Problem in the United
States and Japan,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 24, 1998a, 530-542.
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Yamagishi, T., “The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan,” Social Psychology
Quarterly, 51, 1998b, 265-271.
Yamagishi, T.; Cook, K.; and Watabe, M., “Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United
States and Japan,” American Journal of Sociology, 1998.
Data from the New Experiments
In our regressions for the new experiments we are restricted to include only those variables that have
sufficient variation.
We incorporate age as a dummy indicating if a participant is less than or equal to 18, since the US
subject pool is almost entirely in the age range 18-29, but almost half the Russian subject pool is younger than
18.  The composition of the subject pool in terms of years of work experience is different across countries,
most likely due to the age difference. There is some variation in this variable in both countries, but more so in
the US than in Russia. In both Russia and the US Father’s and Mother’s occupations are both dominated by
the category Business, and also Government in Russia. We therefore include dummy variables for each
parent’s occupation as being either Business or Government. Number in household has very little variation.
Similarly, country of education has almost no variation in the US, and zero variation in Russia. Almost all
subjects in both countries were full time students.  In both Russia and the US the Field of study is dominated
by Business.
We do not include a variable capturing educational level, since the answers in Russia appear to
indicate a misunderstanding: 23 out of 30 respond that they have no college experience, which is obviously
erroneous. It is possible that the question was mis-interpreted as asking if they had completed college.
Country of birth has no variation in Russia, and very little variation in the US, thus it is not included.
Only 5 participants in the US and 2 in Russia report that their parents did not support them. 
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